archived: 28 Aug - 3 Sep, 2005         Back                 Next

                        RICHARD RYAN
                        “To The Last Man”                       

The discussion over the use of Atomic weapons against Japan has been going on for over 50 years. It is always easy to look back in hindsight from today's perspective and try to judge the actions of 60 years ago. However as the son of a Pacific Army vet I must relate that the soldiers, Marines and airmen had no problem with the use of atomic weapons.  

Remember, we killed more people in the fire raids on Tokyo, Dresden and Hamburg, without outcry. While death from a nuclear explosion is horrible, is it any worse than being burned to death in napalm raid? World War II was total war and the war in the Pacific was without quarter or mercy on both sides. Atrocities were many on both sides and the Japanese people would have fought to the death if ordered to by the emperor.  

I don't know what point is trying to be made in this article except maybe we were bad because we used the Atom bomb? Speculating about Japans possible surrender is a pointless exercise. The military held the power in Japan at that time and was prepared to fight to the last man, woman and child. 

                        CATHERINE LYNN
                        “In Japan” 

I couldn't let the bomb discussion go by without relating an experience we had in 1965.  We were in Japan, my husband on leave during a tour of duty in Korea.  Our tour guide for 5 days was a former Kamikaze pilot.  He related to us that he had a card that noted his daily beatings.  He was so miserable he would rather die than continue living with the terrible beatings.  The war ended before his scheduled flight but he told us the propaganda being spread in the country had everyone convinced our troops would rape and kill everyone in the country.  When we did finally arrive and were kind, they were very surprised and grateful.  I think his insight of what was happening would confirm that Japan was ready to fight to the last man rather than surrender. 
 

                        JERRY LOBDILL
                        “Out of Iraq”           

Personally, I thought [Juan] Cole's proposal was too full of details and, like [Michael] Carmichael, I thought we should be getting out of Iraq, not planning further involvement.  Yet Carmichael's approach is still too detailed in my opinion. I still prefer the one put forward through PDA [Progressive Democrats of America], to wit: 

A People's Petition for an Iraq Peace Process 

We propose the following principles as essential to ending the war in Iraq:

First, as a confidence-building measure, the U.S. government must declare that it has no interest in permanent military bases or the control of Iraqi oil or other resources.

Second, as a further confidence-building measure, the U.S. government must set goals for ending the occupation and bringing all our troops home - in months, not years, beginning with an initial withdrawal of troops by the end of this year.

Third, the U.S. government must request that the United Nations monitor the process of military disengagement and de-escalation, and organize a peaceful reconstruction effort. The U.S. must accept its obligation to fairly compensate Iraqis for damages, assist Iraqi reconstruction, cease the imposition of privatization schemes, and end the dominance of U.S. contractors in the bidding process.

Fourth, the U.S. government should appoint a peace envoy independent of the occupation authorities to underscore its commitment to an entirely different mission, that of a peace process ending the occupation and returning our soldiers home.

Fifth, the peace envoy should encourage and cooperate in talks with Iraqi groups opposed to the occupation, including insurgents, to explore a political settlement. The settlement must include representation of opposition forces and parties, and power-sharing and the protection of women's rights as core principles of governance and economic and energy development. We believe such an initiative will reduce, though not eliminate, violence by lessening any rationale for Jihadist or sectarian conflict.

We send this message to all Americans in civil society, to our elected officials, and to the global peace movement. We demand that Congressional hearings begin to define an exit strategy now. We demand that members of Congress, reflecting the will of the people, adopt policy and budget initiatives that call for an exit strategy based on the above principles. We demand a peace envoy, peace talks with the opposition, reconstruction, the closure of U.S. bases, and the safe return home of all U.S. troops.

_____________________________________________

UPDATED:  August 30, 2005 

                        JAY GREENE
                        “Further Thoughts on Use of the Atomic Bomb” 

Those who have been in similar circumstances will recognize the surprise I experienced when reading Dr Steven Jonas' article in TPJ (08 25 05) words I had written privately to friends and had not intended for publication.  Had wider circulation been contemplated my case would have been stated more fully.  I shall do so now. 

Every August, Truman's decision to employ atomic weapons against the Japanese in 1945, first against Hiroshima on August 6 and then Nagasaki three days later, in order to compel Japan's unconditional surrender, is revived and  criticized anew.  Each year the critique is the same and each year those who, like myself, believe it was a correct decision, argue that U. S. policy makers, and ultimately Truman, believed the logic of the situation led ineluctably to using what was then the ultimate weapon. 

Any study of history causes the thoughtful reader to ask, "What should have been done; what could have been done?"  Thoughtful readers, however, when speculating on wrong turns, years after the fact when the principals are dead and all that survives are primary sources, must seek to place themselves in the context of the time and weigh objectively the pressures on decision makers, and the assumptions under which they were working. 

By the Summer of 1945, the U. S. appeared to have won the war against the Japanese.  Almost all territory in the Pacific (but not China) occupied by Japan since 1941 had been retaken; Japanese merchant and naval shipping was sunk and the home islands blockaded; Tokyo and other cities were being bombed and the Japanese had no defensive air power to send up against American B-29s. With the conquest of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, U.S. air power was even closer to the home islands and the Japanese knew invasion was a certainty. 

But Nippon would not surrender.  Yes, there had been some overtures, some feelers, principally through Moscow (the USSR and Imperial Japan were neutral, officially, vis-a-vis each other, despite their membership in warring alliances).  The Allied position with regard to peace feelers had been stated at Casablanca in 1943: unconditional surrender.  Feelers which the US had reason to believe were authoritative were met with the response: very well, surrender.  The Japanese said they would surrender if they could retain the Emperor. The Allies said, that is conditional surrender and we accept no conditions. 

Were the US and Britain (and Dutch and French) simply formalistic sticklers, unreasonably refusing a chance for peace?  That is the charge today. But for two years unconditional surrender was the firm policy of the Allies toward Germany and Japan.  We held firm against Germany when it was argued our interests were better served by a separate peace with Germany, permitting them to continue fighting the USSR.  Unconditional surrender could not be waived. 

Why do not the Japanese leadership in the closing days of the war deserve the obloquy visited on Truman for failing to achieve peace and save the lives of many thousands of their citizens, victims of both the fire bombing of Tokyo and the atomic strikes?  They rejected peace because they could not accept the possible dethroning of their Emperor. Why is there no criticism of Japanese irresponsibility in their insistence on preserving the Emperor's sacred status? 

Those who defend Truman's decision will be forgiven if they see this annual hand wringing as another example of the belief by some that America is always wrong. 

But back to the Summer of '45.  Japan is on the ropes but won't admit it.  The US is planning an invasion of the home islands in November. Based on the Iwo and Okinawa battles, the fighting will be desperate. The American planners know few individuals, military or civilian, will give up; they'll die gloriously for their Emperor.  Surrounded, cut off, starved and without ammunition, they'll fight on to their last breath, taking as many Americans with them as they can. Bypassed and cut off pockets in areas of no strategic importance will persist for years as festering threats. 

But what of Dr Jonas' argument: "The battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, while resulting in relatively heavy US casualties, consumed much of what was left of trained Japanese troops after three years of brutal fighting in the Pacific."  True, but the Japanese still had many hundreds of thousands of fit and undefeated troops in China and Manchuria.  How successfully could they be ferried home?  Not very, but some would make it, bolstering homeland defense.  Ah, but the USSR was pledged to declare war in Japan and their entry would have tied down those troops.  Yes, and prolonged the war, with great loss of life on all sides.  One can imagine Japanese resistance to the Soviets rivaling German resistance to the same foe - an enemy the Japanese had defeated handily forty years before. 

It is to be doubted prospective Russian and Japanese casualties were factors in Washington's thinking of how to end the war; the point was, the longer the war went on, the greater the uncertainties and the number of American casualties.  If the war could be ended quickly, and the bomb seemed the surest way to bring that about, use it. 

The US considered conducting a "public" test of the bomb: invite Japanese representatives to attend an explosion of a bomb, so they could be suitably impressed and surrender in order to avoid the use of this fearful weapon.  Suppose they refused to attend - what then?  

Dr Jonas says they might have attended.  And they might not have. There was no way to guarantee their attendance, or if they did, their drawing the appropriate lesson, and that is why the US rejected the idea of a test.  Make an estimate of the likelihood they would attend; that they would be convinced; that they could convince others in Tokyo to come to the same conclusion.  Weigh those "ifs" against the almost certain destruction of an entire city with a single weapon as a means of compelling a surrender.  What would be your decision? Offer a test, or not? 

With the November invasion in the offing and with every prospect fighting would be desperate, literally to the last ditch, planners estimated 75,000 US casualties.  The Japanese refused to accept our terms.  There was no responsible choice except to use the bomb.  On Hiroshima, in hopes the Japanese would then give up.  On Nagasaki three days later, in the absence of any Japanese response to Hiroshima. 

Let's look at the "what if" posed by critics: suppose Truman withheld the bomb and the invasion went forward.  Eventually we would have subdued the islands, effectively controlling them, although pockets of resistance would have held out for years, as had Japanese soldiers on islands we conquered or bypassed in the Pacific (the last man gave up in the Sixties, I believe).  Eventual capitulation was certain. And what would have been the cost in lives?  Significantly divergent from estimates on the US side?  No one can know.  And would Japanese civilian losses be more or less than those suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki?  Can one argue plausibly they would be significantly less? 

And if Truman had not ordered the atomic strikes, what would have been the effect at home, after tens of thousands of US deaths in the invasion, and the public learned Truman could have used a single bomb that would have ended the war without further American loss?  It's been suggested he would have been impeached.  Given the postwar vitriol directed at Truman by Republicans for far less cause, one can assume impeachment would have been probable. 

Now isn't that too bad, critics will say - that a President loses his job because he did the moral thing and saved Japanese lives (while sacrificing American lives).  Can you imagine how the political landscape would be affected for generations, with the charge that Truman could have ended the war and declined to do so because he cared more for Japanese lives than he did for American ones? 

Dr Jonas does me a disservice by misconstruing one of my arguments as justifying revenge.  He says "For the above defender of the US-standard revenge is apparently an appropriate motivation for a particular tactic of war.  Also in that view it would appear that one dastardly sneak attack (Pearl Harbor) justifies another (or two)." The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and Manila, without a declaration of war, and the war crime that was the Rape of Nanking in 1937, and Japanese treatment of prisoners of war were very much on the minds of Americans in 1945.  Americans, and Truman, can be forgiven in this context if they did not count expected Japanese losses for much in the cold calculation of American versus Japanese lives.  It was not a lust for revenge, but rather a conscious willingness to rate Japanese civilian lives less highly than the lives of American troops, all in the context of Japanese barbarism toward those they had vanquished. 

The Leahy quote is powerful.  According to Jonas, he said the "...use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender . . . ."  But it was not Leahy's decision to make in 1945; neither would he bear the consequences of the decision.  He said they were ready to surrender.  But they had not surrendered, had they?  All the Japanese had to do in order to save Japanese lives would be to surrender.  They did not, for the sake of their Emperor.  So who bears the responsibility of unleashing this barbarous weapon? 

__________  

Junkie:  

First, Greene notes that his discussion in a private email was quoted by Dr. Jonas in the latter’s current TPJ feature.  Greene was not cited as the source by name, Dr. Jonas using Greene’s material, clearly quoted, as the starting point from which to develop a contrary thesis.  We have all seen “private” email circulated and quoted widely beyond a particular listserv. TPJ apologizes to Greene, who has been a frequent contributor to TPJ. 

Second, the debate between Dr. Jonas and Greene is excellent, and TPJ readers are encouraged to read not only Green’s piece above but Dr. Jonas’ current article as well.  Fascinating, thought provoking and stimulating; everything TPJ strives to achieve. 

Third, TPJ would add the following notes to the “history” of the debate.  There is no question that the Japanese government was divided over the issue of surrender.  The historical record appears well established that the Emperor was pressing to sue for peace, and initiated diplomatic efforts using Russia and an intermediary, while the Japanese Military was opposed and preparing the civilian population for war.   

After both bombings, the Emperor simply formed a new government and advised that surrender would be made.  The Emperor actually pre-recorded his statement to the Japanese people.  Elements of the military staged a brief attempt at a coup, but the recording, which had been well secreted by a court aide, was delivered and played.  It was the first time that Japanese citizens had heard the voice of their Emperor.  Equally fascinating, the Emperor spoke in a “royal dialect” spoken at the Imperial Court that most common Japanese did not understand. 

History emphatically records that once the Emperor had spoken there was no resistance to Allied occupation. 

_____________________________________________

                        GEORGE BROOKS
                        “Barometer” 

I sometimes use myself as a barometer. When filling a 3/4 empty gas tank today cost $40, I said for the first time, I gotta do something about this, and I am not a commuter.   

Those sentiments have got to be mounting across the country.  Soon monthly charges by credit card issuers will increase not just reflecting higher interest rates but larger payments on principal. Likewise for loans and variable mortgages. The stock market will tank and people will suddenly feel very poor.   

That spells recession for the mid-term election year and the beginning of the big fall for the Republicans, which should result in a split in the party between moderates and crazies. A long three years ahead of us.  It is not like we have to overcome huge numbers to regain power; we had close to 50% of the country in November, and should add another 10% to 20% as just about everything starts to crumble over the next two years.

The media is afraid to offend Bush, because he will deny access to the White House. Honest reporting could cost a journalist his career. These guys aren't willing to trade that for good reporting. Hopefully, as Bush weakens, and the national sentiment turns decidedly against this administration, the media will pounce on them. We have to find ways to open America's eyes. We have all the ammo we need.  

Your work is all that is needed. How do we get new readers to feel they need it just to survive? Maybe hard times will do it. 

_________   

Junkie:  Brooks is not alone.  Tensions over higher gasoline prices is angering Americans.  Consider this news story that is currently running: 

It's a scene gas station workers say is becoming increasingly common and frightening: Customers angry over gas prices nearing $3 a gallon storm in and decide to take it out on the employees.

"They just yell and scream," said Selam Berhe, assistant manager at a Dallas Tetco station. "They think it's only us that are high-priced."

Incidents of consumer anger and gas-station crime have made headlines across the country, including the killing of a gas station owner in Alabama last week by a driver attempting to steal $52 worth of gas. – Associated Press 

It is incumbent upon the Democratic Party to tell Americans what they can do about higher prices; directing the anger into political action. 

We appreciate your trust and confidence in TPJ.  We are honored that readers make TPJ a part of their political reading.  But TPJ is not the answer.  It is people like you that will make an end to the electoral domination of the radical Republicans.  TPJ picked up this sage advice from a newsletter published by the Medina County (Ohio) Democratic Action Committee: 

IDWIC stands for "I do what I can." You can waste your time being angry and upset with Bush, Taft, the national, state, and local Republican parties, or you can practice IDWIC. Getting angry accomplishes nothing. Doing what you can do to help elect Democrats at the national, state, and local levels is much more satisfying. Look around for volunteer opportunities or for candidates to support financially. Write letters to the editor stating your positions. Invite Democratic officials and candidates to go with you to service club meetings. Find something positive to do politically. Do what you can to make a political difference. 

That is the message for all Democrats and the winning formula. 

                            J. MITCHELL
                            “Frustrated Democrat” 

I don’t' know who you are but you are echoing my very thoughts on the Democratic Party.  They are the most lethargic group of pols on the planet.  I'm so frustrated with their lack of planning, organization, and action that I'm seriously considering going Independent.   

The questions you pose on your site are the very questions I've been asking but in my county of Craven, [North Carolina], there's not a Dem that I know who's a mover and shaker and can move us forward.  Year after year all I see is the SOS.  I'm frankly getting tired.   

Thanks for the insight.  It's good to know I'm not alone. 

______  

Junkie:  Thank you.   

Who is Junkie? I am a Democrat – I am proud to be a Democrat. 

TPJ is predicated on the belief that YOU are the “mover and shaker.”  If your Party is not organized, YOU can organize the Party.  Start on your street, your neighbor hood, your precinct or your county.  Just start! 

You are not alone.  And if all those who feel alone simply start organizing at the smallest level, there will be a Democratic Party. 

Make the effort – be the difference! 

NEXT - TARHEEL DEMS 

Last Update: 03/23/2006