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archived: 28 Aug - 3 Sep, 2005 Back Next UPDATED: August 30, 2005 GETTING OUT OF IRAQ: A REPLY TO JUAN COLE Last week, the distinguished academic expert on Iraq, Juan Cole, published a list of ten suggestions outlining a withdrawal plan for US forces from Iraq (linked below). In so doing, Cole put forward a starting point for serious discussions about that tremendously important subject. That said, his plan falls short. It is unsound, and – at worst - it could produce a lingering regional disaster for decades to come. Cole’s central mistake was to propose a lengthy and provocative series of US military commitments to combat and security operations in post-occupation Iraq. For starters, his points 1 (withdrawal of US troops from urban areas) & 2 (phased withdrawal of US troops from Iraq) are excellent, but point 3 (ongoing US tactical air support for Iraqi forces engaged in pitched battles with insurgents) is where he begins to diverge from reality, not only on the ground in US-Occupied Iraq, but also from the reality of all wars since Vietnam. There will be no set-piece battles in the Iraqi civil war as Cole confidently predicts, and there will certainly be no re-run of the Tet Offensive in Iraq. The civil conflict will be a war of vicious internecine political propaganda and military attrition fought by guerilla forces committed to a full spectrum strategy of terrorist attacks against soft targets inside Iraq, America and any other nations perceived as allies of what they deem to be the puppet government. Not only would the tactical support of the US Air Force be both ineffective and unnecessary, but it would be counterproductive. US tactical air support would require a continuing presence of the USAF in the region providing a constant irritant and fueling the insurgents’ rationale for a guerilla conflict that may well last for generations to come. This policy would be like attempting to put out a raging fire by pouring gasoline into the center of the blazing inferno. Thus, Cole’s points 3 & 4 (US bombing of massed insurgent forces ala a Tet-style offensive) are both ill-conceived and potentially explosive military options. It would be far better to withdraw US air forces and to encourage Iraq to control its own air space and conduct its own air force. Cole’s point 5 is multifaceted, calling for US Secret Service-style protection for unpopular Iraqi political figures (i.e. a massive security detail for Ahmad Chalabi) as well as US-manned Iraqi Homeland Security forces in order to secure the crucial pipelines of oil and gas flowing to the west. These suggestions, while appearing to be prudent, will be neither practical nor effective. Since they would require a high-level of exposure for US security forces and their platoons of military experts, these operations would simply enflame nationalist and anti-American sentiments that are already the driving forces behind the insurgency. It would be better to entrust the security of Iraqi officials and even the most critical aspects of Iraq’s fragile infrastructure to dyed-in-the-wool Iraqi security forces. Cole's point 6 - that the US should help build up an Iraqi armored force of tanks is yet another example of unrealistic military analysis. Of course, this proposal might well be attractive to United Defense Industries, the armored combat vehicle and tank manufacturer created by the Carlyle Group, but armored divisions are ineffective against guerilla actions. Worse. The Iraqi acquisition of heavily armored military divisions could provoke Iranian hostility leading to new tensions and an arms race in the region. At this point, Iraq and Iran have established a peaceful diplomatic relationship. Further competition and conflicts between the two nations could not serve any useful purpose – except for those in the petroleum industry intent on gaining profits from the swift rise in the price of crude oil. Therefore, Cole’s proposal for major armored combat vehicle acquisitions by Iraq represents a major gift for a corporation linked to the Carlyle Group in particular, and the US defense and petroleum industries in general. While it might please their corporate puppets in Congress, a new arms race would exacerbate the political and military instability of the region. In the future, Iraq needs only a minimalist but highly integrated security service of military and police forces to deal with its insurgents and its regional security. Iraq’s most effective weapon against insurgency will be a thriving culture of genuine democracy, laced with heavy lashings of political toleration and more open and effective management of a free and open media that is predicated on the freedom of speech. Obviously, this formula can only come about after a US withdrawal of its armed forces from a nation that can only be described as under heavy military occupation at the present time. Cole's Point 7 calls for the regional administration of future Iraqi elections. While this is probably a good suggestion, we must remember that in Iraq just as in America, political corruption is always a serious threat to the integrity of the democratic process, and there should be a strong central oversight mechanism, as well as international observers in future Iraqi elections as a matter of course. Cole’s Point 8 (general amnesty for un-indicted Ba’athists) is and has been a part of open discussions for at least two years. This is obviously a good idea although it will be opposed vehemently by the Chalabi faction. Equally obvious for more than two years Naomi Klein and others have been recommending measures similar to Cole's Point 9 (US legislation which would mandate that all reconstruction aid would go exclusively to Iraqi firms in order to enhance the economic revival of the beleaguered nation). While Cole’s Point 9 is the single strongest point in his plan, his point 10 offers little realistic hope for improving the general security of the region. In his Point 10, Cole has called for US and Russian presence in regional summits amongst Iraq’s neighbors. This proposal might well ensure that no serious business would or could take place at these crucial meetings. Can you imagine Condi Rice or Zalmay Khalilzad attending regional summit conferences with the foreign ministers of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq? While I can imagine it, I cannot see this tactic accomplishing anything positive – except for the rudimentary education of the US representatives in attendance. Cole’s proposal for elevating the US officials into major players in the regional summits is tantamount to asking Kofi Annan and the UN General Assembly to elevate John Bolton to the post of Chief Executive Officer, to work directly with the Secretary General in shaping, directing and executing the policy of the UN. This proposal will not fly. If Rice or Khalilzad were to strong-arm themselves into some regional summits, they will only guarantee that the real business transacted will be conducted entirely behind closed doors in secret conferences where they will be barred. However, they should probably be forced to attend such summits, where they will be harshly castigated for destroying the political stability of the region and for constantly threatening to broaden the war by bombing Iran and Syria. This dialogue might be a useful exercise for derailing Rice and Khalilzad from their other neoconservative agendas, but it is unlikely that browbeating them will lead to their submission and the withdrawal of the intrusive and uninvited US military from the region as Cole suggests. It might actually impair an open dialogue in the region for years to come. Cole well knows that the regional stability of the Middle East - while crucial to the US and its increasingly delicate economy - cannot be achieved by heavy-weighting or manhandling the states into obedience as if they were recalcitrant children. Diplomacy led by serious encouragement for a peace settlement between Israel and Palestine is the best method for achieving US goals in the region. Diplomacy should be based on mutual respect and interlocking agendas as well as realistic levels of non-military aid. This is nothing new, but intelligent diplomacy (i.e. sans the John Boltons, John Negropontes and Paul Bremers of the world) remains the best method for securing US interests in the future as it has been in the past. For the ambitious optimism of his effort, I applaud Juan Cole, not only for his boldness in proposing such a comprehensive solution to the difficult problem of US military withdrawal from Iraq, but also for his consistent record of sound and reality-based critical analysis of US policy in the middle east. That we disagree on half of his substantive suggestions should in no way imply that I am inimical to his overall thesis - that the US invasion of Iraq was a tragic mistake that has endangered the security not merely of the region but of the world. The menu of US alternatives for ending its involvement in Iraq has never been large, and there are far fewer options left on the table than even the highly informed and perceptive Juan Cole apparently imagines. Cole’s ten point plan is actually an indictment of the mismanagement of the US military invasion and the subsequent diplomatic relationship between the US and Iraq. Cole’s Ten Point Plan actually puts Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Paul Bremer in the stocks of humiliation – along with their Commander-in-Chief and his superior advisor in foreign policy, Vice President Dick Cheney. Cole’s plan has highlighted the inappropriateness of continuing US military tactical operations in this theatre, as well as other deeply misguided US policies including the lamentable direction of hundreds of billions in reconstruction aid to the Halliburtons and its notorious subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown & Root, as well as the infamous Dyncorps of Balkan prostitution fame. In addition, he has called attention to the ill-advised De-Ba’Athification policy of Proconsul Paul Bremer and Ahmad Chalabi. However, I disagree with Cole over his suggestion for continuing the military propping up of the Interim Government. In my judgment, we must not allow the continuing military and diplomatic mismanagement of Iraq to be frozen into position by committing tactical air or ground support ad infinitum for the besieged Iraqi government. Democracy must be allowed to flourish. Unfortunately, the cultivation of democracy in post-Saddam and post-US Iraq may involve many more years of internecine strife and self-inflicted pain for the citizens of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul – a process that might extend far into the future after the withdrawal of US forces. Although we can hope for the best - a swift resolution to the civil conflict in Iraq through the rapid maturation of Iraqi political culture - that objective will only ensue following the withdrawal of the US military occupation. Bottom line, we must be prepared for the worst – and so, too, must the Iraqis. The former UN Arms inspector, Scott Ritter, has just published his own observations on the withdrawal from Iraq. Ritter’s assessment is far more realistic than Cole’s. So far, Senator Russ Feingold is the only Democratic leader who has been willing to accept the challenge laid down last week by Gary Hart who appealed for someone in the opposition party to say, “No more.” Writing in the New York Times, Frank Rich joined Hart in accusing the Democrats of political cowardice. The leadership vacuum in the Democratic Party remains one of the greatest enigmas of these perilous times. Sources
Informed Comment / Juan
Cole, Ten Things Congress Could Demand from Bush on Iraq Alternet / Scott
Ritter, Achieving 'Total Victory' in an Unwinnable War
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