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archived: 1 - 7 May, 2005 Back Next UPDATED: May 5, 2005 ONWARD CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS It is classic Rev. Pat Robertson hyperbole: Federal judges are a more serious threat to America than Al Qaeda and the Sept. 11 terrorists, the Rev. Pat Robertson claimed yesterday. "Over 100 years, I think the gradual erosion of the consensus that's held our country together is probably more serious than a few bearded terrorists who fly into buildings," Robertson said on ABC's "This Week with George Stephanopoulos."
"I think we have controlled Al Qaeda," the 700 Club host said, but warned of "erosion at home" and said judges were creating a "tyranny of oligarchy."
Confronted by Stephanopoulos on his claims that an out-of-control liberal judiciary is the worst threat America has faced in 400 years - worse than Nazi Germany, Japan and the Civil War - Robertson didn't back down.
"Yes, I really believe that," he said. "I think they are destroying the fabric that holds our nation together." – New York Daily News Progressives tend to dismiss Rev. Robertson’s statements; but should we? Beyond the eye catching comparison of Democratic appointed judges to Al Qaeda, Rev. Robertson delivered a short, ominous message that is being overlooked. STEPHANOPOULOS: But, sir, you have described this in pretty -- this whole battle in pretty apocalyptic terms. You've said that liberals are engaged in an all-out assault on Christianity, that Democrats will appoint judges who don't share our Christian values and will dismantle Christian culture. And that the out-of-control judiciary -- and this was in your last book, Courting Disaster -- is the most serious threat America has faced in nearly 400 years of history, more serious than Al Qaeda, more serious than Nazi Germany and Japan, more serious than the Civil War?
ROBERTSON: George, I really believe that. I think they are destroying the fabric that holds our nation together. There is an assault on marriage. There's an assault on human sexuality, as [U.S. Supreme Court] Judge [Antonin] Scalia said, they've taken sides in the culture war. And on top of that, if we have a democracy, the democratic processes should be that we can elect representatives who will share our point of view and vote those things into law. Rev. Robertson is telling Americans that Christian doctrine should be enacted into law – the end of the separation of church and state –theocracy. It is not just Rev. Robertson. The radical religious right is organized and exerting its influence over the Republican Party. Dr. Steve Jonas provides an analysis today in his section of TPJ that will disturb all those who believe in the preservation of constitutional democracy in the United States. Jonas’ “BILL FRIST’S DECLARATION OF WAR”’ is a must read. _____________________________________________ At last, the final details of Bush’s war in Iraq are coming to pubic light. TPJ has been making the case for over two years that Bush largely fabricated the justifications for war. In February 2003, Junkie Editor Michael Carmichael wrote: Following Powell's presentation [to the UN], there was a circumspect reaction from the ranking members of the United Nations. Within the Security Council, with the exception of the UK, the reaction was lukewarm. France's suggestion to increase the number of inspectors and to verify the American allegations on the ground with material evidence has carried the day. The momentum of world opinion is shifting even more decisively against American frustration and bellicosity.
Adlai Stevenson's moment in history is absolutely secure. Powell's bellicose case will be reduced by the powers of retrospection to a propagandistic charade to rally the fifteen percent hard right-wingers of the American electorate at the political core of Bush's popularity. Domestic politics is still the driving force beating at the heart of foreign policy in Bush's America. – TPJ The documents being disclosed in England requires three compelling conclusions. The decision to go to war was made by Bush and Blair and kept secret. Bush and Blair understood that “regime change” alone was insufficient legal justification to initiate a war and they deliberately set out a plan to develop a strong case for war based upon WMD to provide a legal cover and public support for the war. UN Resolution 1441 did not authorize the war without further authorization of the UN; in other words, UN Resolution 1441 did not provide “automaticity.” First, the British press has uncovered a memorandum recounting a briefing given to Blair. This memorandum establishes that Bush and Blair made the decision to initiate war before July 2002. The document reveals Blair backed “regime change” by force from the outset, despite warnings from Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, that such action could be illegal.
The minutes, published by The Sunday Times today, begins with the warning: “This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. The paper should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know.” It records a meeting in July 2002, attended by military and intelligence chiefs, at which Blair discussed military options having already committed himself to supporting President George Bush’s plans for ousting Saddam. – Times Online (emphasis added) The American decision to launch the war can be dated as early as March 2002 when Bush is quoted: "F—k Saddam. We’re taking him out," said President George W. Bush in March 2002, after poking his head into the office of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, TIME reports. -- Drudge Report The British memorandum released this week appears to confirm the Time Magazine report dating the Bush’s commitment to war. Blair was obviously committed to Bush’s effort within three months thereafter. Second, having made the decision to go to war within ten months of the terrorist attack on 9/11, what was the justification for war? The British documents suggest that the reason was “regime change.” However, Blair understood that regime change alone was insufficient, politically or legally. “If the political context were right, people would support regime change,” said Blair. He added that the key issues were “whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan space to work”.
The political strategy proved to be arguing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed such a threat that military action had to be taken. However, at the July meeting Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, said the case for war was “thin” as “Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran”.
Straw suggested they should “work up” an ultimatum about weapons inspectors that would “help with the legal justification”. Blair is recorded as saying that “it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors”.
A separate secret briefing for the meeting said Britain and America had to “create” conditions to justify a war. – Times Online (emphasis added) The memorandum shockingly demonstrates the depth of planning to find politically and legally acceptable reasons to justify the war other than regime change. We now know that the UN Inspectors were sent with no desire to find the truth, but in hopes that Saddam would reject the Inspectors that would provide a basis for war. When Saddam did not reject Inspectors outright and the inspectors did not immediately find WMD, the war was started before the Inspectors could complete their work, because war – not the truth – was the ultimate goal. Third, was the war legal? In a separate leak this week, Blair’s Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, advised the Prime Minister ten days before going to war that the United Nations, not Brittan and America, must determine that Iraq as in violation of UN Resolution 1441 and a specific vote was probably needed to justify the war. Specifically, UN Resolution 1441 had provided Saddam a “final” chance to comply with UN Inspectors. Lord Goldsmith framed the questions correctly: A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.
In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. [...] The key point is that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.
Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution.
However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider very carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.
In reaching my conclusion, I have taken account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions, including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the action under international law was no more than reasonably arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with the view. I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do require a further Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably maintained. However, it must be recognised that on previous occasions when military action was taken on the basis of a reasonably arguable case, the degree of public and Parliamentary scrutiny of the legal issue was nothing as great as it is today. – Guardian Unlimited Lord Goldmith’s memorandum also explains why the “intelligence” on Iraq was cherry picked. Because a UN Resolution to authorize war was probably needed, a “strong case” was needed to proceed to war without a second resolution. That case became weapons of mass destruction and Saddam’s potential development of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, Bush and Blair took intelligence from sources that both American and British intelligence agencies knew were unreliable and painted public images of atomic mushroom clouds and chemical annihilation of western Europe and the United States. These false images served two very real objectives. The images created the public fear that lured citizens in America and Brittan to support the war. The distortions and lies provided a “strong case” legally to justify bypassing the need for a second UN resolution. The release of Lord Goldsmith’s memorandum and the leak of the briefing memorandum obscure a critical fact. At the time UN Resolution 1441 was enacted, we were told that it did not automatically authorize war; a second, specific UN resolution would be needed to authorize war. Who told Americans a second resolution was needed? Our own government! At the time that UN Resolution 1441 was adopted by the UN, John D. Negroponte, Bush’s ambassador to the UN publicly announced: U.S. Ambassador to the UN, urging support for Resolution 1441, quoted in Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2002: "There's no 'automaticity' and this is a two-stage process, and in that regard we have met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution." He added: "Whatever violation there is, or is judged to exist, will be dealt with in the [Security] Council, and the Council will have an opportunity to consider the matter before any other action is taken." -- TPJ (emphasis added) The documents released in England this week, confirm Junkie Editor Michael Carmichael’s assessment in 2003, Powell’s performance before the UN to secure the second vote was a charade. When Powell’s effort failed to convince the UN to pass a second resolution, Bush and Blair went forward to war despite their public pronouncements to secure a second UN Resolution. Another aspect of the march to war is that Blair kept his own government blind as to the full scope of the legal advice he had been given. Lord Goldsmith’s memorandum expressing doubts about the war’s legality was shared with only a few cabinet ministers. Blair even concealed critical information from his own military command. The evidence compels a finding that the British High Command demanded a legal opinion that the war was, in fact, legal:
The admiral added that he had never been shown the crucial 7 March advice by Goldsmith that questioned whether the war was legal. He had only been given a later assurance of legality, which contained none of the caveats. It was only after he questioned Number 10 about legal 'top cover' that he was given Goldsmith's opinion.
Boyce has consistently said he believed the war was legal and morally justified. But, asked whether the government had provided him with the legal cover necessary to avoid prosecution for war crimes, he replied: 'No.' -- Guardian Unlimited (emphasis added). When the time came for Parliament to authorize war, Lord Goldsmith changed his opinion to a more supportive position and that advice was publicly released. His memorandum of ten days earlier was withheld. The tangled web of distortions and deceit perpetrated by Bush and Blair is unraveling. We now have sufficient facts to conclude that two world leaders were willing to perpetrate the malignant “charade” that Junkie Editor Michael Carmichael described to lead us to war. France and the other countries who opposed Bush’s march to war understood what Bush and Blair had manufactured. Americans and the British heaped scorn upon them for their obstinacy. As the truth inalterably emerges, perhaps Americans should be asking: FRENCH FRIES ANYONE?
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